Just connect to the internet and also start to download the web page link we discuss. This is your time and also your calmness to acquire all that you want from this publication Understanding Animation, By Paul Wells. First Published in Fundamental flaw in the text of the kindle version By Bronwyn3d On my page of under the sub-heading 'So whats the answer? Visual education? This is a huge mistake as the text should read "cell" animation. This mistake is repeated on several of the following pages.
A valuable book for animation scholars and researchers By marcia e harbaugh Yes, few pictures. This is not an animation "how-to" or a coffee table book. Instead, this is an extremely valuable book for those interested in animation theory.
I would recommend this text more to academics and scholars interested in animation as a form, than those wanting to learn HOW to animate. Although, I do believe it is extremely important understand the theory behind what we do and the history of how others have done it, I would hate for someone to order this book expecting something more tutorial and technical.
Review on book: Sight and focus Essay. Symbolic Representations of a Complicated Kindness Essay. Order in Peaches Essay. Find Free Essays We provide you with original essay samples, perfect formatting and styling. Order Now. Please check your inbox. Order now. Hi there! Are you interested in getting a customized paper? Check it out! Having trouble finding the perfect essay? Hire a writer. Got it. Huffman [9X1. Wilkinson [AB5. Salway [aDZ. Dick [btJ. Michael Klaper [dHO. Gregory Haff [DlG. Mays [FBw.
O'Brien [fso. Barker [HcB. Doweiko [hPX. Sarma [ipI. Senesac, Mark Bishop [jqa. Arban [KQV. Sommer [LcC. Netter MD [Npc. By Edward Albee [nrI. FACR [oAj. Porter [olp. Piersol [oPX. Rowling [pGB. Foley [PQt. Newman [pUe. Brown [qr2. The Wells Fargo team concluded right up front that the vast majority of Crocker managers would be the wrong people on the bus. Like a professional sports team, only the best made the annual cut, regardless of position or tenure.
But the evidence suggests that the average Crocker manager was just not the same caliber as the average Wells manager and would have failed in the Wells Fargo performance culture.
If they weren't going to make it on the bus in the long term, why let them suffer in the short term? One senior Wells Fargo executive told us: "We all agreed this was an acquisition, not a merger, and there's no sense beating around the bush, not being straightforward with people. We decided it would be best to simply do it on day one.
We planned our efforts so that we could say, right up front, 'Sorry, we don't see a role for you,' or 'Yes, we do see a role; you have a job, so stop worrying about it. To deal with it right up front and let people get on with their lives- that is rigorous. Not that the Crocker acquisition is easy to swallow. It's never pleasant to see thousands of people lose their jobs, but the era of bank deregulation saw hundreds of thousands of lost jobs.
Given that, it's interesting to note two points. To be rigorous in people decisions means first becoming rigorous about top management people decisions. Indeed, I fear that people might use "first who rigor" as an excuse for mindlessly chopping out people to improve performance. And I cringe. For not only will a lot of hardworking, good people get hurt in the process, but the evidence suggests that such tactics are contrary to producing sustained great results.
Even in the Wells Fargo case, the company used lay- offs half as much as Bank of America during the transition era. Six of the eleven good-to-great companies recorded zero layoffs from ten years before the breakthrough date all the way through , and four others reported only one or two layoffs.
In contrast, we found layoffs used five times more frequently in the comparison companies than in the good-to-great companies. Endless restructuring and mind- less hacking were never part of the good-to-great model. How to Be Rigorous We've extracted three practical disciplines from the research for being rig- orous rather than ruthless.
Practical Discipline 1: When in doubt, don't hire-keep looking. One of the immutable laws of management physics is "Packard's Law. It goes like this: No company can grow revenues consistently faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company.
If your growth rate in revenues consistently outpaces your growth rate in people, you simply will not-indeed cannot- build a great company. Driving around Santa Barbara the day after Christmas a few pears ago, I noticed something different about the Circuit City store. But not Circuit City.
It had a banner that read: "Always Looking for Great People. When asked to name the top five factors that led to the transition from mediocrity to excellence, Bruckart said, "One would be people. Two would be people. Three would be peo- ple. Four would be people. And five would be people. A huge part of our transition can be attributed to our discipline in picking the right people. At what point do I compromise? We find another way to get through until we find the right people.
Circuit City put tremendous emphasis on getting the right people all up and down the line, from delivery drivers to vice presidents; Silo developed a reputation for not being able to do the basics, like making home deliveries without damaging the products.
We told them, 'You are the last contact the customer has with Circuit City. We are going to supply you with uniforms. We will require that you shave, that you don't have B. You're going to be professional people.
We would get thank-you notes back on how courte- ous the drivers were. Practical Discipline 2: When you know you need to make a people change, act. The moment you feel the need to tightly manage someone, you've made a hiring mistake. The best people don't need to be managed. Guided, taught, led-yes. But not tightly managed. We've all experienced or observed the following scenario. We have a wrong person on the bus and we know it.
Yet we wait, we delay, we try alternatives, we give a third and fourth chance, we hope that the situation will improve, we invest time in trying to properly manage the person, we build little systems to compen- sate for his shortcomings, and so forth.
But the situation doesn't improve. When we go home, we find our energy diverted by thinking or talking to our spouses about that person. Worse, all the time and energy we spend on that one person siphons energy away from developing and working with all the right people. We continue to stumble along until the person leaves on his own to our great sense of relief or we finally act also to our great sense of relief.
Meanwhile, our best people wonder, "What took you so long? Worse, it can drive away the best people. Strong per- formers are intrinsically motivated by performance, and when they see their efforts impeded by carrying extra weight, they eventually become frustrated.
Waiting too long before acting is equall y unfair to the people who need to get off the bus. For every minute you allow a person to continue holding a seat when you know that person will not make it in the end, you're stealing a portion of his life, time that he could spend finding a better place where he could flourish.
Indeed, if we're honest with our- selves, the reason we wait too long often has less to do with concern for that person and more to do with our own convenience. He's doing an okay job and it would be a huge hassle to replace him, so we avoid the issue. O r we find the whole process of dealing with the issue to be stress- ful and distasteful.
So, to save ourselves stress and discomfort, we wait. And wait. Meanwhile, all the best people are still wondering, "When are they going to do something about this? How long is this going to go on? We found no difference in the amount of "churn" turnover within a period of time between the good-to-great and the comparison companies. But we did find differences in the pattern of churn.
If we get it right, we'll do everything we can to try to keep them on board for a long time. If we make a mistake, then we'll con- front that fact so that we can get on with our work and they can get on with their lives. Often, they invested substantial effort in determining whether they had someone in the wrong seat before concluding that they had the wrong person on the bus entirely. When Colman Mockler became C E O of Gillette, he didn't go on a rampage, wantonly throwing people out the win- dows of a moving bus.
Instead, he spent fully 55 percent of his time during his first two years in office jiggering around with the management team, changing or moving thirty-eight of the top fifty people.
Said Mockler, "Every minute devoted to putting the proper person in the proper slot is worth weeks of time later. There is one corollary that is also important. I spent a lot of time thinking and talking about who sits where on the bus. I called it "putting square pegs in square holes and round pegs in round holes.
Instead of firing honest and able people who are not performing well, it is important to try to move them once or even two or three times to other positions where they might blossom. Two key questions can help. First, if it were a hiring decision rather than a "should this person get off the bus? Second, if the per- son came to tell you that he or she is leaving to pursue an exciting new opportunity, would you feel terribly disappointed or secretly relieved?
Practical Discipline 3: Put your best people on your biggest opportunities, not your biggest problems. In the early s, R. Reynolds and Philip Morris derived the vast major- ity of their revenues from the domestic arena. Reynolds' approach to international business was, "If somebody out there in the world wants a Camel, let them call us.
He identified international markets as the single best opportunity for long-term growth, despite the fact that the company derived less than 1 percent of its revenues from overseas. Cullman puzzled over the best "strategy" for developing international operations and eventually came up with a brilliant answer: It was not a "what" answer, but a "who.
At the time, international amounted to almost nothing-a tiny export department, a struggling investment in Venezuela, another in Australia, and a tiny operation in Canada. Urbane and sophisticated, Weissman was the perfect person to develop markets like Europe, and he built international into the largest and fastest-growing part of the company. The good-to-great companies made a habit of putting their best people on their best opportunities, not their biggest problems.
The comparison compa- nies had a penchant for doing just the opposite, failing to grasp the fact that managing your problems can only make you good, whereas building your opportunities is the only way to become great.
For instance, when Kimberly-Clark sold the mills, Darwin Smith made it clear: The company might be getting rid of the paper business, but it would keep its best people. Then, all of a sudden, the crown jewels are being sold off and they're asking, 'What is my future? We keep them. We interviewed Dick Appert, a senior executive who spent the majority of his career in the papermaking division at Kimberly-Clark, the same division sold off to create funds for the company's big move into consumer products.
T h e right people want to be part of building something great, and Dick Appert saw that Kimberly-Clark could become great by selling the part of the company where he had spent most of his working life. Not that every executive on the team became a fully evolved Level 5 leader to the same degree as Darwin Smith or Colman Mockler, but each core member of the team transformed personal ambi- tion into ambition for the company. This suggests that the team members had Level 5 potential-or at least they were capable of operating in a manner consistent with the Level 5 leadership style.
You might be wondering, "What's the difference between a Level 5 executive team member and just being a good soldier? Yet each team member must also have the ability to meld that strength into doing whatever it takes to make the company great. An article on Philip Morris said of the Cullman era, "These guys never agreed on anything and they would argue about everything, and they would kill each other and involve everyone, high and low, talented peo- ple.
But when they had to make a decision, the decision would emerge. In the end, everybody stood behind the decision. In other words, is it possible to build a great company and also build a great life? The secret to doing so lies right in this chapter. I spent a few short days with a senior Gillette executive and his wife at an executive conference in Hong Kong. During the course of our conver- sations, I asked them if they thought Colman Mockler, the C E O most responsible for Gillette's transition from good to great, had a great life.
Colman's life revolved around three great loves, they told me: his family, Harvard, and Gillette. Even during the darkest and most intense times of the takeover crises of the s and despite the increasingly global nature of Gillette's business, Mockler maintained remarkable balance in his life. He did not significantly reduce the amount of time he spent with his fam- ily, rarely working evenings or weekends. He maintained his disciplined worship practices.
He was so good at assem- bling the right people around him, and putting the right people in the right slots, that he just didn't need to be there all hours of the day and night. That was Colman's whole secret to success and balance. He always seemed to find time to relax that way. This was a man who spent nearl y all his waking hours with people who loved him, who loved what they were doing, and who loved one another- at work, at home, in his charitable work, wherever.
In wrapping up our interview with George Weiss- man of Philip Morris, I commented, "When you talk about your time at the company, it's as if you are describing a love affair. Other than my marriage, it was the passionate love affair of my life. I don't think many people would understand what I'm talking about, but I suspect my colleagues would. A corridor at the Philip Morris world headquarters is called "the hall of the wizards of was.
Similarly, Dick Appert of Kimberly-Clark said in his interview, "I never had anyone in Kimberly-Clark in all my forty-one years say any- thing unkind to me. I thank God the day I was hired because I've been associated with wonderful people. Good, good people who respected and admired one another. In many cases, they are still in close contact with each other years or decades after working together.
It was striking to hear them talk about the transition era, for no matter how dark the days or how big the tasks, these people had fun! They enjoyed each other's company and actually looked forward to meetings. A number of the executives charac- terized their years on the good-to-great teams as the high point of their lives.
Their experiences went beyond just mutual respect which they cer- tainly had , to lasting comradeship. Adherence to the idea of "first who" might be the closest link between a great company and a great life. For no matter what we achieve, if we don't spend the vast majority of our time with people we love and respect, we cannot possibly have a great life.
But if we spend the vast majority of our time with people we love and respect-people we really enjoy being on the bus with and who will never disappoint us- then we will almost certainly have a great life, no matter where the bus goes. The people we inter- viewed from the good-to-great companies clearly loved what they did, largely because they loved who they did it with.
How did such a dramatic reversal of fortunes happen? Kroger transition point occurred in Cumulative returns, dividends reinvested, to January 1, But in the afflu- ent second half of the twentieth century, Americans changed. They wanted nicer stores, bigger stores, more choices in stores. They wanted fresh-baked bread, flowers, health foods, cold medicines, fresh produce, forty-five choices of cereal, and ten types of milk. They wanted offbeat items, like five different types of expensive sprouts and various concoc- tions of protein powder and Chinese healing herbs.
Oh, and they wanted to be able to do their banking and get their annual flu shots while shop- ping. In short, they no longer wanted grocery stores. They wanted Super- stores, with a big block "S" on the chest-offering almost everything under one roof, with lots of parking, cheap prices, clean floors, and a gazillion checkout lines.
What's so interesting about that? Yet one of these two companies confronted the brutal facts of reality head-on and completely changed its entire system in response; the other stuck its head in the sand. He tried to carry out, against all opposition, what he thought Mr. John [Hartford] would have liked. Hartford do? Hartford continued to be the dominant force on the board for nearly twenty years.
Never mind the fact that he was already dead. In one series of events, the company opened a new store called The Golden Key, a separate brand wherein it could experiment with new methods and models to learn what customers wanted. Customers really liked it. Here, right under their noses, they began to discover the answer to the questions of why the! They didn't like the answers that it gave, so they closed it.
Kroger also conducted experiments in the s to test the superstore concept. The rise of Kroger is remarkably simple and straightforward, almost maddeningly so. During their interviews, Lyle Everingham and his prede- cessor Jim Herring CEOs during the pivotal transition years were polite and helpful, but a bit exasperated by our questions.
To them, it just seemed so clear. When we asked Everingham to allocate one hundred points across the top five factors in the transition, he said: "I find your question a bit perplexing. We also learned that you had to be number one or num- ber two in each market, or you had to exit. But once we looked at the facts, there was really no question about what we had to do.
So we just did it. The whole system would be turned inside out, store by store, block by block, city by city, , state by state. By the early s, Kroger had rebuilt its entire system on the new model and was well on the way to becoming the number one gro- cery chain in America, a position it would attain in Of course, the good-to-great compa- nies did not have a perfect track record. But on the whole, they made many more good decisions than bad ones, and they made many more good decisions than the comparison companies.
Even more important, on 7 the really big choices, such as Kroger s decision to throw all its resources into the task of converting its entire system to the superstore concept, they were remarkably on target.
This, of course, begs a question. Are we merely studying a set of com- panies that just happened by luck to stumble into the right set of deci- sions? O r was there something distinctive about their process that dramatically increased the likelihood of being right? The answer, it turns out, is that there was something quite distinctive about their process.
The good-to-great companies displayed two distinctive forms of disci- plined thought. The first, and the topic of this chapter, is that they infused the entire process with the brutal facts of reality. Kroger, like all good-to-great companies, developed its ideas by paying attention to the data right in front of it, not by following trends and fads set by others. Interestingly, over half the good-to-great companies had some version of the "number one, number two" concept in place years before it became a management fad.
When, as in the Kroger case, you start with an honest and diligent effort to determine the truth of the situation, the right decisions often become self-evident. Not always, of course, but often. And even if all decisions do not become self-evident, one thing is certain: You absolutely cannot make a series of good decisions without first confronting the brutal facts.
The good-to-great companies operated in accordance with this principle, and the comparison compa- nies generally did not. Consider Pitney Bowes versus Addressograph.
It would be hard to find two companies in more similar positions at a specific moment in history that then diverged so dramatically. Until , they had similar revenues, profits, numbers of employees, and stock charts.
Both companies held near-monopoly market positions with virtually the same customer base- Pitney Bowes in postage meters and Addressograph in address-duplicating machines-and both faced the imminent reality of losing their monopo- lies.
A self-described "conglomerateur," Ash had previously built Litton by stacking acquisitions together that had since faltered. According to Fortune, he sought to use Addressograph as a platform to reestablish his leadership prowess in the eyes of the world. Yet the truth went unheard until it was too late. Ash some credit for being a visionary who tried to push his company to greater heights.
And, to be fair, the Address- ograph board fired Ash before he had a chance to fully carry out his plans. They all seemed a bit, well, to be blunt, neurotic and compulsive about Pitney's position in the world. You'd better pay attention to this. Strong, charismatic leaders like Roy Ash can all too easily become the de facto reality driving a company. Throughout the study, we found comparison companies where the top leader led with such force or instilled such fear that people worried more about the leader-what he would say, what he would think, what he would do- than they worried about external reality and what it could do to the com- pany.
Recall the climate at Bank of America, described in the previous chapter, wherein managers would not even make a comment until they knew how the CEO felt. We did not find this pattern at companies like Wells Fargo and Pitney Bowes, where people were much more worried about the scary squiggly things than about the feelings of top manage- ment. The moment a leader allows himself to become the primary reality peo- ple worry about, rather than reality being the primary reality, you have a recipe for mediocrity, or worse.
This is one of the key reasons why less charismatic leaders often produce better long-term results than their more charismatic counterparts. Good to Great 73 Winston Churchill understood the liabilities of his strong personality, and he compensated for them beautifully during the Second World War.
Churchill, as you know, maintained a bold and unwavering vision that Britain would not just survive, but prevail as a great nation-despite the whole world wondering not if but when Britain would sue for peace. Dur- ing the darkest days, with nearly all of Europe and North Africa under Nazi control, the United States hoping to stay out of the conflict, and Hitler fighting a one-front war he had not yet turned on Russia , Churchill said: "We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime.
From this, nothing will turn us. We will never par- ley. We will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his gang. We shall fight him by land.
We shall fight him by sea. We shall fight him in the air. Until, with God's help, we have rid the earth of his shadow. He feared that his towering, charismatic personality might deter bad news from reaching him in its starkest form. So, early in the war, he created an entirely separate department outside the normal chain of command, called the Statistical Office, with the prin- cipal function of feeding him-continuously updated and completely unfiltered-the most brutal facts of reality.
As the Nazi panzers swept across Europe, Churchill went to bed and slept soundly: "I. Doesn't motivation flow chiefly from a compelling vision? One of the dominant themes that runs throughout this book is that if you successfully implement its findings, you will not need to spend time 7 and energy "motivating ' people. If you have the right people on the bus, they will be self-motivated. The real question then becomes: How do you manage in such a way as not to de-motivate people?
And one of the single most de-motivating actions you can take is to hold out false hopes, soon to be swept away by events. How do you create a climate where the truth is heard?
We offer four basic practices: 1. Lead with questions, not answers. In , one year after he assumed C E O responsibility from his father, Alan Wurtzel's company stood at the brink of bankruptcy, dangerously close to violation of its loan agreements. At the time, the company then named Wards, not to be confused with Montgomery Ward was a hodgepodge of appliance and hi-fi stores with no unifying concept. Over the next ten years, Wurtzel and his team not only turned the com- pany around, but also created the Circuit City concept and laid the foundations for a stunning record of results, beating the market twenty- two times from its transition date in to January 1, When Alan Wurtzel started the long traverse from near bankruptcy to these stellar results, he began with a remarkable answer to the ques- tion of where to take the company: I don't know.
Unlike leaders such as Roy Ash of Addressograph, Wurtzel resisted the urge to walk in with "the answer. We had some wonderful debates in the boardroom. It was never just a dog and pony show, where you would just listen and then go to lunch.
He used the same approach with his executive team, constantly pushing and probing and prodding with questions. Each step along the way, Wurtzel would keep asking questions until he had a clear picture of reality and its implications. Why, why, why?
0コメント